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Sources of the Self
Scholarly Personae as Repertoires of Scholarly Selfhood1
herman paul
The concept of ‘scholarly personae’ emerged about a decade ago in the history 
of science. Since then it has increasingly been used both inside and outside the 
historical discipline. This article examines where this interest comes from, what 
shapes it takes, and what types of research it stimulates. The thesis advanced in 
this article is that interest in scholarly personae, defined as ideal-typical models 
of being a scholar, emerges from at least four different sources. 1) The theme 
enables historical theorists to develop a ‘philosophy of historical practices’. 2) It 
offers historians the possibility of writing an integrated history of the sciences 
and the humanities. 3) It challenges linear story lines in historical writing. 4) Last 
but not least, it stimulates moral reflection on contemporary models of being a 
scholar, if only by providing a vocabulary for those wishing to judge models like the 
‘successful grant applicant’ on their relative merits.
Bronnen van het zelf. Wetenschappelijke personae als repertoires van wetenschappelijke 
identiteit
Een jaar of tien geleden deed het concept ‘wetenschappelijke personae’ zijn intrede 
in de wetenschapsgeschiedenis. Sindsdien wordt het zowel binnen als buiten de 
historische wetenschap in toenemende mate gebruikt. Dit artikel onderzoekt 
waar deze belangstelling vandaan komt, welke vormen zij aanneemt en wat voor 
typen onderzoek zij stimuleert. De these die het artikel ontvouwt, luidt dat 
interesse in wetenschappelijke personae, opgevat als ideaaltypische modellen van 
wetenschapper-zijn, uit tenminste vier verschillende bronnen voorkomt. 1) Het 
thema stelt geschiedtheoretici in staat een ‘filosofie van historische praktijken’ te 
ontwikkelen. 2) Het biedt historici de mogelijkheid een geïntegreerde geschiedenis 
van natuur- en geesteswetenschappen te schrijven. 3) Het stelt lineaire verhaallijnen 
in de geschiedschrijving ter discussie. 4) Last but not least stimuleert het concept
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
1 This article is based on papers presented to the 
Royal Netherlands Historical Society (knhg) 
in The Hague on 28 November 2014 and to the 
‘Scientific Personae in Cultural Encounters’ 
(spice) project at the University of Groningen 
on 12 December 2014. I would like to thank the 
organisers for their invitations and the audiences 
at both occasions for perceptive feedback. I am 
particularly indebted to Mineke Bosch, Pieter 
Huistra, Kaat Wils, and two anonymous reviewers 
for thought-provoking questions and comments. 
Funding was generously provided by the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(nwo).
2 Caspar Hirschi, ‘Piraten der Gelehrtenrepublik. 
Die Norm des sachlichen Streits und ihre 
polemische Funktion’, in: Kai Bremer and 
Carlos Spoerhase (eds.), Gelehrte Polemik. 
Intellektuelle Konfliktverschärfungen um 1700 
(Frankfurt am Main 2011) 176-213, 178. For a very 
similar confession, see Sari Kivistö, The Vices of 
Learning: Morality and Knowledge at Early Modern 
Universities (Leiden 2014) vii.
morele bezinning op contemporaine modellen van wetenschapper-zijn, onder 
andere door een vocabulaire ter beschikking te stellen voor wie modellen als de 
‘succesvolle subsidieaanvrager’ op hun merites wil beoordelen.
Introduction
A couple of years ago the young Swiss historian Casper Hirschi began an 
article on early-modern learned polemics with the observation that he, like 
many other scholars in their mid- or late thirties, had not yet acquired a 
permanent academic position. As a postdoc researcher he was still supposed 
to ‘develop’ himself, although Hirschi added sceptically that a scramble 
for fellowships and temporary teaching positions contributes very little to 
development in an intellectual sense of the word. What he took from this 
experience, however, was an interest in early-modern scholarly practices, 
or more specifically in frictions between noble ideals of scholarship as a 
democratic conversation, in which arguments are supposed to be the only 
things that matter, and the ‘steep hierarchies’ of academic institutions in 
which such conversations are supposed to take place. Hirschi was not afraid of 
admitting that his attempt at historicising such tensions was ‘partly inspired 
by a desire for change, partly also by a need for understanding’ what was at 
stake in his own experience.2
Something similar fuels at least part of the recently growing interest 
in scholarly personae. Although the concept of scholarly personae (or scientific 
personae) as introduced about a decade ago by Lorraine Daston, H. Otto 
Sibum, Ian Hunter and others is primarily a tool for historians of the sciences 
and the humanities interested in the demands that scholarly practices of 
various sorts make upon a scholar’s habits, dispositions or capabilities, there 
are various reasons why these habits, dispositions or capabilities capture 
scholarly attention. While some of these emerge in the contexts of long-








3 Gabrielle M. Spiegel (ed.), Practicing History: New 
Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic 
Turn (New York, London 2005).
scholarship in being stimulated quite directly by present-day concerns about 
personae that are seen as being threatened by current higher education 
politics or by uneasiness about a perceived gap between ‘excellence’ and 
‘innovation’ in contemporary academic parlance and the impact of reward 
systems that have little to do with either excellence or innovation.
What I would like to do in this article is to sketch four different 
approaches to the persona theme, whereby ‘approach’ serves as shorthand for 
a set of questions or concerns that prompt scholars to focus their attention on 
scholarly personae. I will argue that the concept enables historical theorists to 
develop a ‘philosophy of historical practices’, while it encourages historians 
of the sciences and the humanities to examine the transmission of repertoires 
of scholarly selfhood throughout disciplines and time frames. This, in turn, 
prompts a much-needed rethinking of developmental narratives, according 
to which models of being a scholar succeed each other in time. With Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison, I will argue that we need ‘a repository rather than a 
rupture view’ of history. Finally, I will use the occasion to respond to friendly 
criticism voiced elsewhere in this issue, emphasising that ‘personae’ and 
‘performances’ of scholarly identity can never be considered apart from each 
other.
Historical theory
Let us start in my original field of expertise – historical theory. In the past 
half century historical theorists have expended much energy discussing 
two closely related questions: what are historical explanations and what are 
historical narratives? Especially in the English-speaking world, the covering 
law model of historical explanation as designed by Carl G. Hempel and 
‘narrativist’ philosophy of history as represented by Hayden White were the 
two main themes dividing the field and defining its agenda. Consequently, 
historical theory focused almost exclusively on historians’ written output – 
on articles and books in which historians develop their explanations and 
present their narrative accounts. Other, non-discursive aspects of the 
historians’ practice – think of such ‘doings’ as reading, taking notes, teaching 
classes, evaluating grant proposals, and organising conference panels – 
were almost completely ignored. Part of this neglect was addressed by what 
presented itself as a ‘practice turn’ in historical theory, although it is fair to 
say that calls for such a turn have been more frequent than actual attempts at 
studying historical practices from a theoretical point of view.3 Scholars such 
as Ewa Doman´  ska, Aviezer Tucker and myself therefore have introduced the 
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
4 Aviezer Tucker, ‘Temporal Provincialism: 
Anachronism, Retrospection and Evidence’, 
Scientia Poetica 10 (2006) 299-317; Herman Paul, 
‘Performing History: How Historical Scholarship 
is Shaped by Epistemic Virtues’, History and 
Theory 50 (2011) 1-19. While in previous writings 
on the subject I have been careful to acknowledge 
Tucker’s contributions, I have regrettably failed 
to refer to Ewa Doman´ska, who as early as 2004 
argued in a conference paper: ‘Perhaps theory of 
history needs some change of focus, so let’s try 
to think for a while about intellectual virtues and 
vices instead of text, narrative, tropes and let’s 
try to define historical knowledge in terms of the 
virtues’ (quoted from private correspondence 
with Ewa Doman´ska, 30 September 2014). The 
lecture was delivered in English, but published 
only in Polish in Ewa Doman´ska, Historia 
egzystencjalna: Krytyczne studium narratywizmu i 
humanistyki zaangaz˙owanej (Warsaw 2012).
5 Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An 
Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical 
Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge 1996) 137.
6 Noël Carroll, ‘Interpretation, History and 
Narrative’, The Monist 73 (1990) 134-166, 161; Mark 
Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge 
1999) 96-106.
7 Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, Postnarrativist Philosophy 
of Historiography (Basingstoke 2015) 123-128; Bart 
Karstens, ‘Pluralism within Parameters: Towards 
a Mature Evaluative Historiography of Science’ 
(PhD thesis; Leiden University 2015) 215-229.
8 Raymond Martin, The Past Within Us: An Empirical 
Approach to Philosophy of History (Princeton nj 
1989) 30-52.
concept of virtues to offer historical theorists a vocabulary for discussing 
such attitudes or dispositions as meticulousness, perseverance, intellectual 
courage and fairness that historians display, or must display, in order to excel 
in teaching, research and administrative ‘doings’.4
Although language of virtue is becoming increasingly widespread 
among historical theorists in Europe and North America, this does not imply a 
consensus on the need to move beyond ‘explanations’ and ‘narratives’ towards 
‘practices’ and ‘doings’. Virtues, after all, come in two sorts. On the one hand, 
there are virtues in the original sense of human dispositions or character 
traits (‘a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a 
characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success 
in bringing about that end’).5 On the other, virtues can be metaphorically 
interpreted as qualities not of human beings but of scholarly theories or 
interpretations (let us call them ‘theory virtues’). Following Noël Carroll and 
Mark Bevir, among others6, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen and Bart Karstens have 
recently been advocating a virtue approach to issues of theory choice. The idea 
is that scholars employ such virtues as ‘accuracy’ and ‘scope’ in assessing the 
relative merits of competing explanations. If they find themselves confronted 
with diverging interpretations of, say, the social conventions governing 
scholarly polemics in early-modern Europe, it is virtues like ‘accuracy’ and 
‘scope’ that enable them to determine which of these interpretations is most 
convincing.7 Although I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning, especially in 
so far as it replaces absolute criteria for theory choice by comparative ones, the 
question at stake is a fairly classic one. It continues a well-established tradition 








9 Perhaps the most light-hearted introduction to 
the subject is Donald E. Hall, The Academic Self: 
An Owner’s Manual (Columbus oh 2002) – a 
book I would recommend as required reading for 
graduate students.
10 Herman Paul, ‘What is a Scholarly Persona?: Ten 
Theses on Virtues, Skills, and Desires’, History 
and Theory 53 (2014) 348-371, 357-360 doi 10.1111/
hith.10717 (with references to more specialized 
literature).
If we are interested in shifting attention from what historians produce 
(explanations, narratives) to what it takes to engage in processes of acquiring 
and distributing knowledge (research, teaching, outreach), these theory 
virtues turn out to be of no avail. What we need is a vocabulary for describing 
the demands made on the scholar’s professional ‘self’ such as provided by 
virtues in the original sense of human dispositions.
Arguably, however, virtues are too narrow a category for describing 
the full range of what scholarly selfhood entails. Scholarly selfhood is an 
embodiment of attributes that, at a given time and place, are regarded as 
essential for the pursuit of scholarly work.9 These attributes include virtues 
of the sort just mentioned – meticulousness, perseverance and intellectual 
courage – but typically also such things as the capacity to decipher early-
modern handwriting, the ability to find relevant secondary literature and the 
capability of writing a grant proposal. For this reason, I have argued elsewhere 
that the category of virtues must be supplemented with that of skills – an 
umbrella term for linguistic skills, reading skills, study skills, writing skills 
and organisational skills, to mention but a few. ‘Skills’ here include ‘talents’ 
such as frequently invoked in debates over the historian’s ‘artistic qualities’. 
Thus the ‘narrative talent’ needed for writing a compelling narrative is a 
literary skill, not a virtue, just as the ability to manage thousands of notes, 
photocopies and/or computer files is an organisational skill, not a virtue. 
What virtues and skills have in common is a teleological aspiration: they aim 
at realising something difficult. However, whereas skills aim at realising 
concrete projects – reading a source, writing a paper, convincing a grant 
selection committee – virtues aim higher: they pursue such abstract goods as 
knowledge of the past and moral understanding.10
The categories of virtues and skills as I have just described them 
allow at least a partial description of scholarly selfhood. It might well be that 
additional categories such as ‘faculties’ (memory, perception) are needed for 
providing a more exhaustive description of what it takes, in terms of personal 
attributes, to be a scholar. I would prefer however, to keep the analysis focused 
on virtues and skills, partly because these, historically speaking, are the most 
contested categories and partly also, more pragmatically, because virtues 
and skills already provide us with a quite substantial number of variables. 
For virtues and skills never come alone. It is necessary, but not sufficient, for 
historians to be accurate and thorough. In one way or another, the virtues 
of accuracy and thoroughness must be balanced by other virtues and skills, 
such as visionary power, intellectual courage and literary skill. It is therefore 
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
11 Herman Paul, ‘Weak Historicism: On Hierarchies 
of Intellectual Virtues and Goods’, Journal of the 
Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 369-388.
12 See, e.g., Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The 
‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical 
Profession (Cambridge 1988).
13 Paul, ‘What is a Scholarly Persona?’, 363-365.
not individual virtues and skills, but clusters of virtues and skills that are 
demanded from the ‘scholarly self’. This, subsequently, not only applies to 
what scholars are expected to do in particular situations – the virtues and 
skills that should guide them in writing a monograph, reviewing a book or 
refereeing a grant application – but also, more generally, to what it takes to 
be a scholar in the first place. Different conceptions of scholarly selfhood 
tend to operate with different catalogues of virtues and skills, depending on 
the relative weight they assign to such goods as knowledge, moral insight, 
political power and economic profit.11 
It is such constellations of commitments that I regard as distinctive 
of scholarly personae. Scholarly personae, understood as models embodying 
the personal attributes that are regarded as necessary for being a scholar, 
distinguish themselves through the relative importance they attach to 
the acquisition of knowledge, the synthesis of research, the transmission 
of scholarly insight, the education of the general public and the desire to 
influence political decision-making (not to mention other goods that scholars 
pursue). These different goods, in turn, make different demands on scholars: 
they require different virtues and skills. This implies that constellations of 
commitments translate themselves into constellations of virtues and skills, 
that is, into different prioritisations of qualities. Usually, when scholarly 
personae clash, they do so on the concrete level of these qualities, with scholars 
quarrelling over the question, for example how important it is to strive for 
objectivity.12 Ultimately however, it is the scholars’ commitments – what are 
the goods that scholars qua scholars should pursue? – that determine how 
much weight is assigned to such virtues and skills. Decisive is the relative 
importance they attach to the various goods to which they are committed. 
Scholarly personae then, are ideal-typical views on what it takes to be a 
scholar, defined by their constellations of commitments, which translate into 
constellations of virtues and skills.13
History of the sciences and the humanities
If this sounds rather abstract, scholarly personae become much more concrete 
in a second approach, advanced particularly by historians of the sciences 
and the humanities. In a sense, they begin where historical theorists stop. 
For if scholarly personae come in the plural, given that scholars in different 
circumstances often judge differently about the relative importance of 








14 Ian Hunter, ‘The History of Philosophy and the 
Persona of the Philosopher’, Modern Intellectual 
History 4 (2007) 571-600 and idem, ‘Hayden 
White’s Philosophical History’, New Literary 
History 45 (2014) 331-358. For Hadot’s ‘spiritual 
exercises’, see especially Pierre Hadot, Philosophy 
as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to 
Foucault, translated by Michael Chase (Oxford, 
Cambridge ma 1995). I am indebted to an 
illuminating email conversation with Ian Hunter in 
September 2014.
15 Lorraine Daston and H. Otto Sibum, 
‘Introduction: Scientific Personae and Their 
Histories’, Science in Context 16:1-2 (2003) 1-8, 5 
doi 10.1017/S026988970300067X.
16 See Mineke Bosch’s contribution to this issue. 
On scholarly appropriations of aristocratic 
repertoires, see also Mary Jo Nye, ‘Aristocratic 
Culture and the Pursuit of Science: The De 
Broglies in Modern France’, Isis 88 (1997) 397-421.
be subject to historical development. Historical research on the emergence, 
transmutation and deployment of scholarly personae is then of crucial 
importance. Moreover, historical research can add much-needed nuance to 
theoretical generalisations of the sort presented under my first heading and 
show in concrete historical detail how, why and under what circumstances 
scholarly personae are invented, appropriated, contested, revised, combined 
and rejected.
Historians pursuing this second research agenda do not always do 
so with the same questions in mind. Ian Hunter, for example, writes the 
history of philosophy through the prism of personae in order to highlight the 
‘psychagogy’ involved in all philosophising, that is, the production of specific 
types of subjects by means of ‘spiritual exercises’ in Pierre Hadot’s sense of the 
word.14 Lorraine Daston and H. Otto Sibum, by contrast, have attempted to 
show that culturally sanctioned models of being a scholar tend to be variations 
on a limited number of archetypes, such as the Naturforscher, the femme savant 
and the technocrat.15 While Mineke Bosch also works with prototypes or 
repertoires, she is more interested in offering thick descriptions of how 
such models are appropriated in specific acts of scholarly self-fashioning 
(for example, how the twentieth-century nobleman and history professor 
Pieter Jan van Winter, drawing on ancient aristocratic and ascetic repertoires, 
cultivated an image of himself as sober, honest and hard-working in order to 
lend credence to his work).16
Distinct as these historical approaches are, they are united by what I 
would call a hermeneutic understanding of the relation between ‘personae’ 
and ‘performances’. In one way or another, they all emphasise the mutual 
dependency of models, archetypes or templates of scholarly conduct on the 
one hand and practices of ‘subjectification’ (also spelled as ‘subjectivation’ 
or ‘subjectivisation’) on the other. Subjectification refers to processes of 
producing, reproducing, and representing socially sanctioned selves or, 
in academic settings, to practices that turn students into ‘professional’ 
scholars, for instance by rewarding ‘professional’ conduct or discouraging 
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
17 Andreas Gelhard, Thomas Alkemeyer 
and Norbert Ricken (eds.), Techniken der 
Subjektivierung (Paderborn 2013).
18 Especially stimulating is Ulrich Brockling, 
Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer 
Subjektivierungsform (Frankfurt am Main 2007).
19 Richard Kirwan (ed.), Scholarly Self-Fashioning 
and Community in the Early Modern University 
(Farnham 2013).
20 Harry Bresslau, untitled autobiography, in: Sigfrid 
Steinberg (ed.), Die Geschichtswissenschaft der 
Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen ii (Leipzig 1926) 
29-83.
21 Manfred Hettling and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann 
(eds.), Der bürgerliche Wertehimmel. Innenansichten 
des 19. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen 2000).
22 Falko Schnicke, Die männliche Disziplin. 
Zur Vergeschlechtlichung der deutschen 
Geschichtswissenschaft 1780-1900  
(Göttingen 2015) 153.
23 Bresslau, untitled autobiography, 32-35, 45. 
On the genre of historians’ autobiographies 
more generally, see Jeremy D. Popkin, History, 
Historians, and Autobiography (Chicago il 2005).
‘unprofessional’ behaviour.17 Although subjectification outside the university 
has received more scholarly attention so far than subjectification within 
academic contexts18, historians of science have drawn attention to one specific 
form of subjectification known as ‘scholarly self-fashioning’.19 Borrowed from 
Stephen Greenblatt, this concept refers to modes of representation rather than 
to modes of production. Its leading questions are: How do scholars depict 
themselves in public? How do they present themselves to their students, to 
their colleagues or to the general public? How do they pose for a portrait, 
depict themselves in autobiographical writing or dress for an academic event? 
By addressing these questions, students of scholarly self-fashioning examine 
the identity politics of scholarly self-representation (why did the Jewish 
historian Harry Bresslau in his autobiography keep silent about his religious 
background?)20 as well as the politics of clothing and (facial) hair (why did so 
many nineteenth-century professors have moustaches and side whiskers?).
Just like other forms of subjectification though, self-fashioning 
can never be an act of creatio ex nihilo: it always draws on available scripts or 
repertoires. Take the oil portraits that have been painted of Leopold von 
Ranke (1868), Theodor Mommsen (1881) and Johann Gustav Droysen (1885). 
As Falko Schnicke has recently shown, these portraits are highly stylised 
images that depict the historians as respectable, industrious and productive 
(key virtues in the nineteenth-century bürgerliche Wertehimmel).21 The portraits 
achieve this partly by drawing on the visual conventions of the professorial 
portrait, partly also by providing the three historians, in the best tradition 
of saint symbolism, with individualising attributes such as copies of their 
own books.22 Autobiographies often followed similar strategies. When 
Bresslau wrote at length about his gymnasium and university teachers, while 
emphasising that he conducted his historische Übungen in the 1870s ‘after 
Droysen’s example with tea and cake in my house’, he followed a conventional 
narrative template in which loyalty (Treue) to former teachers was of key 








24 Aleksandra Pawliczek, ‘Zwischen Anerkennung 
und Ressentiment. Der jüdische Mediävist Harry 
Bresslau (1848-1926)’, Simon Dubnow Institute 
Yearbook 6 (2007) 389-409.
25 I borrow this term from Jochen Zwick, 
‘Akademische Erinnerungskultur, 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Rhetorik im 19. 
Jahrhundert. Über Emil Du Bois-Reymond als 
Festredner’, Scientia Poetica 1 (1997) 120-139.
26 Confusingly, some scholars use ‘persona’ to refer 
to what I call ‘performance’ and therefore treat 
‘personae’ not as synonymous to ‘repertoires’, 
but as performative appropriations of such 
repertoires. See, e.g., Mineke Bosch, ‘Persona 
and the Performance of Identity: Parallel 
Developments in the Biographical Historiography 
of Science and Gender, and the Related Uses 
of Self Narratives’, L’Homme 24:2 (2013) 11-22. 
This, however, is a terminological issue only: the 
hermeneutic model underlying Bosch’s research 
is near similar to the one just sketched.
27 Jens P. Ackermann, Die Geburt des modernen 
Propagandakrieges im Ersten Weltkrieg. Dietrich 
Schäfer, Gelehrter und Politiker (Frankfurt am Main 
2004); Bernd Mütter, ‘Georg Hüffer (1851-1922): 
Ein katholischer Historiker zwischen Kirche und 
Staat, Ultramontanismus und Historismus’, 
Westfälische Forschungen 61 (2011) 307-343; 
also in Bresslau’s linear story of progression towards a full professorship in 
Strasbourg – a story concealing that his Jewish background in reality had been 
a serious barrier to his career.24
Against this background, one might argue that ‘self-fashioning’, 
like other forms of subjectification, is best conceptualised in terms of 
‘performance’, which is to say that it consists of appropriation and adaption 
of one or more existing repertoires of scholarly selfhood. Performances 
like Bresslau’s draw on scripts or models, which in turn are kept alive to 
the extent that they are transmitted in academic practice or in ‘academic 
memory cultures’.25 This implies that personae and performances can never 
be considered apart from each other. Personae and performances are like the 
foci of an ellipse: they presuppose each other. Historians therefore need this 
pair of terms – not just the one or the other – to do justice to both individual 
agency (the freedom to choose, reject, adapt and transform existing models of 
scholarly selfhood) and the discursive power of culturally sanctioned scripts 
(the scholarly personae available at a given time and place).26
Concretely, this means that histories of scholarly personae will never 
operate at an ideal-typical level but show in concrete detail how scholars in 
the past found themselves torn between different, incompatible personae and 
wove their way between them. Why did Dietrich Schäfer try to reconcile his 
commitment to meticulous archival research in the tradition of his teacher 
Georg Waitz with grand-scale historical interpretation after the example of 
Heinrich von Treitschke? Why could Waitz’s Catholic student Georg Hüffer 
identify with neither the objectivity cult of the Ranke Renaissance nor the 
ultramontane Catholic alternative personified by Johannes Janssen? Why did 
Albert Naudé, a former student of Bresslau, increasingly model himself after 
Reinhold Koser, a Prussian historian whose talent for narrative synthesis was 
as pronounced as Bresslau’s interest in ‘getting the facts straight’?27
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity

A highly stylized oil painting depicting historian  Leopold 
von Ranke, by J. Schrader (1868). 









Herman Paul, ‘The Virtues and Vices of Albert 
Naudé: Toward a History of Scholarly Personae’, 
History of Humanities 1 (2016) 327-338.
28 On which see Kerwin Lee Klein, From History to 
Theory (Berkeley ca 2011) 17-34 and Horst Walter 
Blanke, Historiographiegeschichte als Historik 
(Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt 1991).
29 Joep Leerssen, ‘The Rise of Philology: The 
Comparative Method, the Historicist Turn, and 
the Surreptitious Influence of Giambattista 
Vico’, in: Rens Bod, Jaap Maat and Thijs 
Weststeijn (eds.), The Making of the Humanities ii 
(Amsterdam 2012) 23-35; James Turner, Philology: 
The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities 
(Princeton nj 2014).
30 John V. Pickstone, Ways of Knowing: A New History 
of Science, Technology, and Medicine (Chicago il 
2000) 9.
Historiography
Historical research along the lines just sketched has two interesting 
implications for what is known among historians as ‘historiography’ – the 
history of historical studies as taught in academic history programmes by way 
of introduction to the discipline’s past.28 One is implied in everything said so 
far: historians are not alone in struggling with scholarly personae. Moreover, 
the kinds of dilemmas historians are facing – how desirable is service to 
the state in relation to academic freedom or ‘getting the facts straight’ in 
comparison to answering ‘big questions’? – are sometimes surprisingly 
similar to those faced by scholars elsewhere in the humanities. Historians 
and non-historians sometimes even draw on similar personae in solving 
such dilemmas, as witnessed by the persona of the meticulous philologist 
that made a career throughout the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Geisteswissenschaften.29 This implies that research on scholarly personae has 
the potential of opening up transdisciplinary perspectives: it can trace and 
compare personae across disciplinary divides. A persona-oriented focus 
therefore encourages historians of historiography to enlarge their canvas so 
as to write not only disciplinary histories, but contribute to a ‘history of the 
humanities,’ as this emerging field is nowadays called.
However, if I label the third approach to scholarly personae 
‘historiographical’, I am referring to a second, more fundamental implication 
than a widening of disciplinary horizons. In the history of science, technology 
and medicine (stm), John Pickstone and others have drawn attention to 
how ‘ways of knowing’ can emerge, rise to prominence and recede to the 
background. Crucial is their insight that ways of knowing can lose their 
currency, but seldom disappear entirely. As Pickstone argues: ‘(N)ew ways of 
knowing are created, but they rarely disappear. As Western society has grown 
more complex, so ways of knowing and doing have been built up. [...] In this 
view, history of stm is not a matter of successions, or the replacements of one 
kind of knowledge by another; rather it is a matter of complex cumulation and 
of simultaneous variety, contested over time, not least when new forms of 
knowledge partially displace old forms.’30 Ian Hacking uses similar terms in 
arguing that scientific ‘styles of reasoning’ are better seen as ‘cumulative’ than 
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as ‘successive’. They are like layers added on top of each other. Although the 
top layers, of course, are more visible than the lower ones, it would be wrong 
to assume that older layers disappear in the accumulation process.31
Can the same be said about scholarly personae? Lorraine Daston 
and Peter Galison answer this question affirmatively. They are committed 
to what they call ‘a repository rather than a rupture view (of history, H.P.)’, 
according to which the archetypical models that scholarly personae are serve 
as repertoires.32 Although not all repertoires are manifestly present at one and 
the same time, they are latently available as possibilities as long as they are 
either transmitted in scholarly practice or remembered in scholarly memory 
cultures. This explains why Johannes Kepler, confronted with conflicting 
demands made on his persona, could fall back on a late medieval model of the 
scholar as ‘Mathematicus, Philosophicus, Historicus’33, or why Georg Hüffer, 
the nineteenth-century student of Waitz, could solve his aforementioned 
dilemma by identifying with the scholarly persona of seventeenth-century 
Maurists (French Benedictine scholars engaged in critical historical 
scholarship).34 Such appropriations or re-appropriations of seemingly 
outdated personae in fact, are not all too uncommon. Wasn’t Hayden White, 
to some extent, a twentieth-century mix of Giambattista Vico and Alexis de 
Tocqueville?35 Isn’t there a sense in which current-day big data specialists in 
‘digital humanities’ vary on models developed by sixteenth-century humanist 
philologists?36
If scholarly personae resemble Pickstone’s ways of knowing and 
Hacking’s styles of reasoning in being cumulative rather than successive, 
then historical research on scholarly personae potentially challenges some of 
the developmental models that are current in the history of historiography. 
I refer not only to Whiggish disciplinary histories of the sort often criticised 
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‘modernisation’ and ‘professionalisation’ of historical studies, with often 
remarkable linear story lines, and to the ‘schools’ and ‘approaches’ on which 
historiography textbooks often treat their readers. The antiquarian school, 
for instance, is typically presented as an early-modern tradition that was 
‘superseded’ by Rankean history writing – even though offshoots of this 
antiquarian tradition can be found up to the present day. Students likewise 
learn that historicism was a nineteenth-century mode of thought that 
vanished with the world wars and the post-war attempt at getting ‘beyond 
historicism’.38 However, does not this very epochal mode of history writing 
testify to the enduring attractiveness of historicism, as do recent reappraisals 
by Frank Ankersmit and others?39 Developmental models are often ill-
prepared to deal with such unexpected comebacks and creative appropriations 
of older modes of studying the past.
The question therefore is how well developmental models can 
account for scholarly personae in the sense of repertoires that are not always 
manifestly present, but strangely able to re-emerge in different forms if 
circumstances so require. Does a history of the humanities written through 
the prism of scholarly personae require a different, non-developmental plot? 
Can it be written as a story in the first place? This is what I would call the 
historiographical challenge, defined as the challenge to rethink inherited 
models of how to write the history of the sciences and the humanities if those 
inherited models appear unable to handle Kepler’s seventeenth-century 
appropriation of a medieval template, Hüffer’s identification with an early 
modern archetype and White’s attempt to be a twentieth-century Vico and 
Tocqueville at the same time.
Moral self-reflection
Such templates from the past, finally, play a major role in the fourth 
approach I would like to distinguish. Scholarly personae are also of particular 
significance to moral reflection on the question what sort of scholars we 
want to be in our own day. May I exemplify this, after Hirschi’s example, 
with a small piece of autobiography? In the 1990s I received a solid, perhaps 
somewhat old-fashioned, instruction in history at the University of 
Groningen. I remember being sent to small and far-away archives to study 
the minutes, correspondences and annual reports of nineteenth-century 
public libraries in Holland. This kind of instruction left me with an enduring 
fascination for archival research and honest admiration for careful historical 
reasoning. However, in my PhD research on the aforementioned Hayden 
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White, I soon encountered a different type of persona – an historian strongly 
committed to a moral agenda and eager to address large ethical questions 
by historical means. This was a model that, for different reasons, I also came 
to appreciate. Now, more than a decade later, I am directing a research team 
at Leiden University with money gained at the research grant market – a 
market that makes quite different demands on me and requires a rather 
different kind of curriculum vitae (a ‘track record of achievements’) than I 
would have written ten years ago. Most importantly, through its practices 
of subjectification, including especially its status reward system, it imposes 
a different persona on me than traditional archival research or moral 
commitment along the lines envisioned by White: it encourages productivity, 
self-promotion and careerism to a greater degree than either of the two other 
models would allow. Facing such a diversity of models, I presume I am not 
the only historian pondering such questions as, ‘Is there a difference between 
a good and a successful historian?’, ‘What kind of an historian do I want to 
be?’ and ‘How can I navigate the tensions between my ideals, the expectations 
held and by students and the wider public and the practices of subjectification 
dominating current academic life?’
There are several modes of reflection on the moral concerns underlying 
these questions. One is to take a stance against the growing dominance 
of, especially, the ‘economic gaze’ in modern academia by exposing and 
criticising (often also ridiculing) the neoliberal logic behind it.40 There is 
a well-established genre of monographs and manifestos on the ills of the 
neoliberal university, which navigate with different degrees of subtlety 
between policy analysis and policy evaluation. Unfortunately, they are often 
stronger in their criticism than in their suggestions for improvement, also 
with regard to scholarly personae. ‘The paradigmatic neoliberal academic’, 
writes Jeffrey R. Di Leo, for instance, ‘is a docile one. He [sic] is the product 
of an academic culture dominated by the recording and measurement of 
performance, rather than the pursuit of academic freedom or critical exchange 
– an academic climate that renders him risk averse and compliant.’41 Although 
Di Leo detests this persona, the ‘acts of resistance’ that he concretely envisions 
hardly transcend the negative level of ‘disruption’ and ‘resistance’. Tellingly, 
in his conclusion he quotes Pierre Bourdieu on neoliberalism as ‘a discourse 
that is very difficult and hard to fight’ and Baruch Spinoza on ‘all things 
excellent (being, H.P.) as difficult as they are rare’.42 In so far then, as this is 
a representative example, criticism of neoliberalism might help us, modern 
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More interesting, from this perspective, is a second type of moral 
reflection paradigmatically embodied by a piece that recently received 
tens of thousands of views on academia.edu even before it was officially 
published: a collectively authored article entitled ‘For Slow Scholarship: A 
Feminist Politics of Resistance through Collective Action in the Neoliberal 
University’.43 Although the authors – eleven geography professors from 
Canada and the United States – severely criticise the ‘temporal regimes of the 
neoliberal university’, they do so from a positive commitment to what they 
call a ‘feminist ethics of care’, central to which are practices such as listening, 
conversing and caring, which in turn revolve around virtues like openness, 
humility, patience and trust. Concretely, the authors not only give advice 
(‘count what others don’t’, ‘turn off email’, ‘make time to think’, ‘say no’, ‘take 
care’), but also report about their attempts to practice what they preach by 
writing the article collectively, without time pressure, in multi-voiced format, 
for publication in an open-access environment. Although, obviously, the 
authors cannot themselves perform a full-blown alternative to the neoliberal 
persona, they do whatever they can to alert their readers to the ideal of a 
persona in which openness, humility, patience and trust serve as key virtues.44
Finally, a third mode of reflection might consist of open-ended 
questioning. It does not start with firmly established positions, but with 
careful discernment and assessment of the demands that currently prevailing 
personae make upon scholars, what sort of dispositions and habiti they 
encourage, what sort of alternative repertoires are available and how 
attractive these various personae are, especially but not only from a moral 
point of view. In a sense, this third mode combines the two earlier ones. It is 
more focused however, on encouraging moral self-scrutiny than on taking a 
stance (negatively or positively). Consequently, its preferred genre is not the 
pamphlet or the manifesto, but the conversation. Preferably, this conversation 
takes place in a collegial setting such as offered in the gathering for which 
this article was originally written – a one-day conference organised by the 
Royal Netherlands Historical Society in November 2014, aimed at exploring 
the moral dilemmas that Dutch historians inside and outside the academy 
encounter in their day-to-day work. The conversations that took place in 
interactive workshops as well as over lunch and coffee were helpful, I think, 
not because the over one-hundred participants agreed (which they often did 
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not), but because their exchanges encouraged moral self-reflection and offered 
some conceptual tools for it.
It should be added, however, that these tools, including the very 
concept of virtue, make this third mode of reflection less open-ended than 
might seem at first sight. Inevitably, if not deliberately, virtue language is 
loaded with normative connotations. For one thing, it invokes categories 
of aspiration which assume that the (epistemic, moral, political) goods that 
human beings pursue can be realised only partially: nobody is 100 percent 
righteous, honest or impartial. Virtuousness therefore is not measured 
in binary terms, but on sliding scales.45 Virtues moreover, are classically 
understood as dispositions that can only be acquired through long-term 
practice which, in turn, is guided by examples or ‘paradigms’. Virtue 
language therefore implicitly draws attention to the roles of imitation and 
repetition in acquiring scholarly habits.46 Finally, given the anachronistic 
flavour that language of virtue has acquired in the early decades of the 
twentieth century47, the political subtext of using virtue language in a 
neoliberal context is hard to miss. At the very least it suggests the possibility 
or desirability of alternatives to language of ‘excellence’ (such as typically 
used in academic self-descriptions) as well as to rule- and procedure-oriented 
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A response to friendly criticism
So far I have distinguished four sets of questions and concerns that make 
scholars interested in scholarly personae. Obviously, this typology has more 
than just a variation-finding purpose. For despite their differences, overlap 
and interdependence between the four approaches are not hard to detect. 
For one thing, historians engaged in moral self-reflection (approach 4) might 
benefit from not ignoring how personae are studied in the three preceding 
approaches. They might want to understand what personae are (approach 1), 
how they function in actual practice (approach 2) and whether available 
repertoires of scholarly selfhood are restricted to those currently in fashion 
(approach 3). More importantly, despite the variety in terminology used 
within the four approaches, I have described them in such a way as to show 
that they can all operate productively with a definition of scholarly personae 
in terms of constellations of virtues corresponding to constellations of goods – 
which might be a great benefit especially for interdisciplinary exchange.
At this point, however, it seems that not everyone is fully convinced. 
Elsewhere in this issue, some respected colleagues articulate the worry that 
scholarly personae defined as constellations of goods remain too abstract to 
be of much value in actual historical research. They fear that my definition 
unduly prioritises such abstract things as knowledge of the past over the 
concrete realities of university doors that remained closed to black or female 
scholars, role uncertainty among first-generation academics from minority 
backgrounds, and work-life balances threatened by stereotypically gendered 
role expectations. Also, they doubt whether categories of virtue and skill have 
sufficient explanatory power to account for the rise of, say, the ‘paradigmatic 
neoliberal academic’ invoked by Jeffrey Di Leo. Why do I keep silent about 
social contexts, including institutional hiring and funding policies and 
audiences responsible for attributing expertise? Does not my definition 
suggest that I am interested more in x-rays of bones, so to speak, than in flesh 
and blood (not to mention dress and haircut as important markers of social 
distinction)?49
I think this criticism reflects a misunderstanding of the hermeneutic 
model sketched above. For the model expressly grants gowns, moustaches 
and side whiskers just as important a place in historical research as skeleton-
like constellations of goods. Its double focus on personae and performances, 
which can never exist apart from each other, conveys that detailed case studies 
on the material, embodied and gendered performances of scholarly personae 
at specific times and places are just as important as generalising typologies of 
the role models invoked by scholars in, say, the past three centuries. Indeed, 
the very idea of the model is that it requires human beings of flesh and 
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blood, enmeshed in the socio-political realities of their own times and places, 
to articulate, appropriate, adjust and choose between models of scholarly 
selfhood. For scholarly personae do not have an agency of their own: it is 
people within the possibilities and constraints of their subject positions who 
draw upon them, make them available and put them up for discussion. 
This does not imply, however, that definitions of scholarly personae 
improve if we include those people within them. It surely takes bricklayers, 
carpenters, electricians and plumbers to build a house, but it would be 
strange to find those skilled labourers drawn in the floor plan or playing 
a role in architectural distinctions between villas, bungalows and country 
houses. Likewise, it would be a category mistake – a conflating of personae 
and performances and a confusing of the two foci of the ellipse – to expect 
attention for material and embodied practices shaping scholarly identities 
from definitions of scholarly personae. We need a concept of scholarly 
personae just as architectural historians need such archetypes as ‘villa’, 
‘bungalow’ and ‘country house’: not to offer thick descriptions of individual 
houses under construction, but to facilitate reflection on the models and 
archetypes on which architects draw. I would therefore encourage my 
colleagues ‘to speak with two words’, as the Dutch saying has it: to examine 
in concrete detail how scholarly personae are being performed, without 
forgetting that such performances always draw on repertoires that as such 
transcend the particularities of time, space, bodies and human relations.
Given the currently dominant interest in ‘science as if it was produced 
by people with bodies, situated in time, space, culture, and society, and 
struggling for credibility and authority’50, it may seem unfashionable to draw 
attention to models, templates or repertoires existing above and beyond the 
level of the individual. Let me add, therefore, the rather empiricist argument 
that the sources simply force historians to address them. For the nineteenth-
century book reviews, obituaries and scholarly polemics that I am studying 
in the context of my current project continuously invoke constellations of 
goods. Sometimes, they refer to such constellations with abstract dichotomies 
between ‘the professor’ versus ‘the schoolmaster’ or ‘the historian’ versus 
‘the journalist’ – stereotypical job descriptions expressing the priorities of 
‘research’, ‘teaching’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘entertainment’ as goods worthy of 
pursuit.51 More frequently, however, constellations of goods were named 
after specific individuals, whereby proper names served as generic names 
to the extent that they denoted archetypical models more than specific 
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von Giesebrecht’s conversion from ‘Hegel’ to ‘Ranke’, these served as stylised 
labels denoting distinct modes of studying the past.53 Likewise, the ‘Waitz’ 
and ‘Sybel’ between whom Friedrich von Bezold felt he had to choose, and 
the ‘Dahlmann’ that Conrad Varrentrapp invoked against the hegemony 
of ‘Waitz’, did not primarily refer to Georg Waitz, Heinrich von Sybel and 
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann as individuals: their names had come to serve 
as shorthand for models that put different weight on the historian’s political 
responsibility.54 It is models like these, then, to which scholarly personae 
refer, without ignoring that it was individuals such as Riezler, Bezold and 
Varrentrapp who invoked these constellations of goods in specific historical 
contexts.
Conclusion
Just as Casper Hirschi’s interest in power relations in the early-modern 
Republic of Letters was fuelled in part by his own academic experience, so 
contemporary reflection on scholarly personae emerges partly out of moral 
uncertainty: what sort of scholars do we want to be, given the variety of 
models we are currently facing? Without projecting present-day dilemmas 
back onto the past, research along the lines sketched in this article might have 
the potential of showing that scholarly personae in the sense of constellations 
of goods have long-term histories and that the proper relations between 
epistemic, moral, political, aesthetic, and economic goods have been subject 
of scholarly debate for centuries at least. Also, it might provide a helpful 
vocabulary for analysing currently fashionable models of being a scholar 
in terms of the goods they favour (what is the relative weight of social and 
economic goods, compared to moral and epistemic ones, in the persona of the 
‘successful grant applicant’?)
At the same time, this article has argued that historical theorists 
and historians of the sciences and the humanities have reasons of their 
own for welcoming scholarly personae as a topic of reflection. While the 
concept provides the former with tools for moving from a ‘philosophy of 
historiography’ to a ‘philosophy of historical practices’, it enables the latter to 
examine the transmission and reception of repertoires of scholarly selfhood 
scholarly personae: repertoires and performances of academic identity
throughout disciplines and time frames. To the extent that scholars across 
the entire academic spectrum struggle with the question what sort of scholar 
they would like to be, scholarly personae could serve as a conceptual focus for 
an integrated history of the sciences and the humanities. Finally, it prompts a 
rethinking of developmental narratives in the history of the sciences and the 
humanities in so far as it challenges the historicist assumption that models of 
being a scholar simply succeed each other. If scholarly personae are cumulative 
rather than successive, historians will have to replace their conventional linear 
storylines by repository-based frameworks, able to account for sometimes 
surprising comebacks and reappearances of older models of scholarly 
selfhood.
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